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THE COST RECOVERY ACT AND 
TOBACCO LITIGATION IN CANADA: A 
MODEL FOR FAST FOOD LITIGATION 
INTRODUCTION 
besity is a growing problem in Canada.1 One in four Ca-
nadian adults is obese, and the number of obese Canadi-
ans has doubled since the 1980s.2 Numerous medical conditions 
are associated with obesity, including diabetes, hypertension, 
heart disease, and cancer.3 As of 2001, obesity related illnesses 
cost approximately C$380 million annually in British Columbia 
alone.4 This represents approximately 4.5% of British Colum-
bia’s total health care costs.5 The health care costs associated 
with these diseases across Canada has also increased from 
C$1.55 billion in 2000 to C$1.98 billion in 2008.6 Because Can-
ada utilizes a universal health care system, these costs are 
foisted upon the public in the form of taxes.7 
Tobacco use is also a problem in British Columbia, where ap-
proximately C$525 million are paid to treat tobacco related ill-
nesses. 8  “If 10% of [British Columbia’s] smokers quit, they 
would save the [British Columbia] economy approximately $2.9 
billion in costs over their lifetimes” in avoided medical care 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. See PUB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., OBESITY IN CANADA: A JOINT REPORT 
FROM THE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA AND THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE 
FOR HEALTH INFORMATION 1 (2011) [hereinafter Pub. Health Agency of Can.]. 
 2. See id. at 1. 
 3. See id. at 2. 
 4. See Ronald Colman, Cost of Obesity in British Columbia, GPI ATLANTIC 
2 (2001). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Pub. Health Agency of Can, supra note 1, at 29. Estimates of the 
total economic cost of obesity in Canada, including health care expenditures 
and costs in productivity, range from C$4.6 billion to C$7.1 billion annually. 
Id. 
 7. See Jay Marenko, Canada’s Health Care System: An Overview of Public 
and Private Participation, MAPLELEAFWEB.COM (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canada-s-health-care-system-
overview-public-and-private-participation [hereinafter Marenko Overview]. 
 8. See Jennifer Bridge & Bill Turpin, The Cost of Smoking in British Co-
lumbia and the Economics of Tobacco Control, HEALTH CANADA 35 (2004), 
available at http://www.gpiatlantic.org/pdf/health/tobacco/costoftobacco-
bc.pdf. 
O
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costs and productivity losses.9 The British Columbia legislature 
devised its own way of recouping health care costs associated 
with tobacco use when it passed the Tobacco Damages and 
Health Care Cost Recovery Act (“Cost Recovery Act”).10 The 
statute authorized British Columbia to initiate litigation 
against tobacco manufacturers to recoup health care costs paid 
to treat tobacco related illnesses.11 However, when British Co-
lumbia initiated a lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers un-
der the Cost Recovery Act, the tobacco manufacturers implead 
the Canadian federal government.12 On July 29, 2011, the Su-
preme Court of Canada dismissed the tobacco manufacturer’s 
third-party claim.13 This left the tobacco manufacturers as the 
sole defendants in the lawsuit14 and potentially liable for bil-
lions of dollars in judgments or settlements.15 The Cost Recov-
ery Act and the ensuing tobacco litigation initiated pursuant to 
the Act demonstrate a litigation model that has found some ini-
tial success in Canadian courts.16 
Historically, plaintiffs bringing claims against food retailers 
and manufacturers for contributing to their obesity have had to 
overcome causation and assumption of risk issues.17 This Note 
examines how the Cost Recovery Act and the modern litigation 
strategies developed in tobacco litigation provide a blueprint 
for health care cost recovery lawsuits that Canadian provinces 
could potentially initiate against manufacturers and retailers 
in the food industry. 
                                                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 53–54. 
 10. See Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 
S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 (Can.). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] S.C.C. 42 (Can.). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Julia Zebley, Canada Supreme Court Rules Against Tobacco Indus-
try in Two Major Cases, JURIST (July 29, 2011, 12:04 PM), 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/canada-supreme-court-rules-federal-
government-not-liable-for-tobacco-related-ailments.php. 
 15. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Does the World Still Need United States Tort 
Law? Or Did It Ever?, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 283, 298 (2011) [hereinafter Cupp 
World]. 
 16. See, e.g., R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] S.C.C. 42 (Can.). 
 17. See generally Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the Next Tobacco? 
Lessons Learned from Tobacco for Obesity Litigation, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
61, 73–79 (2006). 
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Part I of this Note will provide background on Canada’s uni-
versal health care system and the tenets of the Canadian 
Health Act that make the Cost Recovery Act advantageous to 
tobacco litigants. Part II will examine how development of to-
bacco litigation in the United States influenced Canada’s own 
tobacco litigation and what effect it might have on food litiga-
tion in Canada. Part III will compare the issues faced by plain-
tiffs in United States “fast food” litigation to the issues faced by 
plaintiffs in tobacco litigation, including assumption of risk and 
causation arguments. Part IV of this Note will examine the at-
tributes of the Cost Recovery Act that rebut the causation and 
assumption of risk arguments, making the Act an attractive 
model for potential future food litigants in Canada. 
I. HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 
Canada’s universal health care system currently operates as 
a mix of private and public entities.18 Physicians work in pri-
vate practice and bill provincial health insurance plans for 
their services.19 Hospitals are run by community boards or vol-
unteer organizations, but they are administered by regional 
authorities as non-profit companies, and their operating budg-
ets are determined by provincial health plans.20 Private insur-
ance is effectively prohibited for coverage of any service provid-
ed for in provincial health plans and is mainly used for dental 
services and prescription drugs.21 
                                                                                                                                     
 18. See Leonard J. Nelson, III, A Tale of Three Systems: A Comparative 
Overview of Health Care Reform in England, Canada, and the United States, 
37 CUMB. L. REV. 513, 524 (2006/2007). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Marenko Overview, supra note 7. 
 21. “Canada is also the only country that effectively prohibits private 
health insurance for hospital and physician services. Although private medi-
cal insurance is not banned specifically by the Canada Health Act, federal 
and provincial governments have historically interpreted the Act as intend-
ing to ban private insurance. While only six provinces legally prohibit private 
medical insurance for medically necessary services, all provinces have other 
policies in place that penalize providers who choose to bill privately for ser-
vices. In practice, private insurance is generally only permitted to cover goods 
and services that are not covered by our universal government-run health 
insurance plan, mainly dental services and prescription drugs.” Mark Rovere, 
Why It’s Time Government Called “Time Out” on the Canada Health Act, 
FRASER INST. (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/publicationdisplay.aspx?id=17023&terms=HO
W+GOOD+IS+CANADIAN+HEALTH+CARE. 
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Canada’s health care system has been the subject of criticism 
and political debate.22 For instance, Canada’s health care sys-
tem has been criticized for having long wait times before a pa-
tient can receive specialized care.23 Even though wait times 
have recently decreased, some Canadians still feel that they 
are too long.24 In addition, there has been debate over the long 
term sustainability of the provincial health care system amid 
recent decreases in federal funding.25 
Canada took its first step towards its current universal 
health care system in 1947 when Saskatchewan adopted a uni-
versal hospital care plan that featured province-wide cover-
age.26 By 1950, British Columbia and Alberta had adopted sim-
ilar plans,27 and by 1961 all Canadian provinces and territories 
provided universal hospital coverage.28 In 1966, Canada’s fed-
eral government passed the Medicare Act, which provided fed-
eral funding to cover 50% of the provinces’ health care costs 
and expanded the insurance coverage to include hospital and 
physician services.29 By 1972, all of Canada’s provinces and 
territories were providing the expanded coverage subsidized by 
the Medicare Act.30 However, in the late 1970s, the rising costs 
of medical care caused Canada to stop paying 50% of the prov-
ince’s health care costs.31 In the absence of federal health care 
reimbursement, provinces were no longer obligated to meet 
federal health insurance requirements and were allowed great-
                                                                                                                                     
 22. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 526. 
 23. See Michael M. Rachlis, A Canadian Doctor Diagnoses U.S. 
Healthcare, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/03/opinion/oe-rachlis3. 
 24. See Brett J. Skinner, Questioning Success on Health Care Wait Times, 
FRASER INST. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/publicationdisplay.aspx?id=17388&terms=heal
th+care+wait+time. 
 25. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 526. 
 26. See Canada’s Health Care System, HEALTH CANADA (Oct. 9, 2010), 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/system-regime/2005-hcs-sss/index-
eng.php. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 524. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 525. 
 31. Jay Makarenko, Canadian Federalism and Public Health Care: The 
Evolution of Federal-Provincial Relations, MAPLELEAFWEB.COM (Jan. 30, 
2008), http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canadian-federalism-and-
public-health-care-evolution-federal-provincial-relations. 
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er control over the administration of their health care sys-
tems.32 In order to cover the money that the federal govern-
ment was no longer providing, some provinces implemented 
such controversial measures as collecting user fees and extra 
billing, which threatened some provincial citizens’ access to 
health care.33 In 1984, Canada passed the Canada Health Act, 
which reinstated the program for federal reimbursement of 
health care costs, created penalties for imposing user fees and 
extra billing, and imposed requirements for receiving federal 
reimbursement.34 The central tenets of the Canada Health Act 
are public administration, comprehensive coverage of “medical-
ly necessary” services, universal coverage of all provincial citi-
zens, continuous coverage even if the citizen is outside of the 
province or the country, and reasonable access to services.35 
As will be demonstrated in Part IV, the Canada Health Act’s 
tenet of universal access and the role of the provinces in financ-
ing the health care system are important factors in making the 
Cost Recovery Act beneficial to tobacco plaintiffs. 
II. TOBACCO LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
Tobacco litigation in the United States has been described as 
taking part in three waves.36 The first two waves were largely 
unsuccessful for plaintiffs, as individual claimants struggled to 
make headway against a tobacco industry that refused to set-
tle.37 However, the states found huge success during the third 
wave of litigation when they entered into the Master Settle-
                                                                                                                                     
 32. Jay Makarenko, The Canada Health Act: Provisions & Administration, 
MAPLELEAFWEB.COM (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canada-health-act-provisions-amp-
administration [hereinafter Marenko Provisions]. In order to receive the fed-
eral subsidies, provinces were required to implement their health insurance 
systems according to federal guidelines which included expansive coverage of 
hospital and physician services. Nelson, supra note 18, at 525. 
 33. See Makarenko Provisions, supra note 32. 
 34. Nelson, supra note 18, at 525. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, Reaching Equilibrium 
in Tobacco Litigation, 62 S.C. L. REV. 67, 70 (2010). 
 37. See Stephen E. Smith, “Counterblastes” To Tobacco: Five Decades of 
North American Tobacco Litigation, 14 W.R.L.S.I. 1, 6 (2002); see also Hen-
derson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74. 
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ment Agreement with tobacco manufacturers.38 Tobacco litiga-
tion in Canada has mimicked this course of development, with 
British Columbia’s health care cost recovery suit ultimately 
finding success in the Supreme Court of Canada.39 
A. History of Tobacco Litigation in the United States 
The first wave of tobacco litigation in the United States be-
gan in the 1950s and continued through the 1960s.40 During 
this era of tobacco litigation, individual plaintiffs found little 
success,41 in part because at the time tobacco companies could 
not have known about the health risks of smoking cigarettes.42 
Another obstacle to plaintiffs’ success during the first wave of 
litigation was the need to prove specific causation.43 Even if a 
plaintiff proved that cigarettes were generally harmful and 
contributed to cancer and other illnesses, it was very difficult 
for a plaintiff to prove that her particular injuries were caused 
by smoking.44 The tobacco companies refused to settle any law-
suits during the first wave of litigation and forced plaintiffs to 
expend a great deal of personal resources in taking their claims 
to trial.45 
The second wave of tobacco litigation in the United States 
took place from the 1980s to the early 1990s, and was equally 
unsuccessful for the plaintiffs.46 This second wave was precipi-
tated by an increased awareness in the American public re-
garding the dangers of cigarette smoking following the release 
of the U.S. Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health 
in 1964.47 In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette La-
                                                                                                                                     
 38. See Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the 
Public Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER 
L. REV. 159, 161 (2011). 
 39. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42. 
 40. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 70. 
 41. See Smith, supra note 37, at 6. 
 42. See id. at 10–11. 
 43. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 70–71. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 71. 
 46. Smith, supra note 37, at 14–19. 
 47. See U.S. DEP’T  OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE (1964); see also Report of the Surgeon General, NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MED., http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/NN/p-
nid/60/p-docs/true (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
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beling and Advertising Act, which required that warning labels 
be displayed on cigarette packaging.48 Ironically, Congress’ ef-
forts to educate the public regarding the dangers of tobacco 
would ultimately prove to protect tobacco manufacturers dur-
ing the second wave of tobacco litigation.49 Tobacco manufac-
turers argued in Cipollone v. Liggett Group that the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and other statutes like 
it (the “Cigarette Acts”) preempted plaintiffs from claiming 
that the tobacco manufacturers had failed to warn them of the 
dangers of smoking. 50  In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court 
preempted all failure-to-warn tort claims based on state law 
that post-dated the Cigarette Acts.51 While the Court held that 
fraud and express warranty claims were not preempted, those 
claims were difficult to establish during the second wave era.52 
The tobacco manufacturers continued their “no settlement” pol-
icy during the second wave of tobacco litigation, leaving indi-
vidual plaintiffs little chance of success.53 
The third wave of tobacco litigation began in the mid-1990s.54 
At the beginning of the third wave, plaintiffs were poised to 
find success because documents produced from the tobacco 
manufacturers’ files during congressional hearings strength-
ened plaintiffs’ fraud claims that the manufacturers misrepre-
sented the health hazards of smoking.55 In addition, plaintiffs 
began utilizing class action suits to pool resources.56 The third 
wave also featured state governments filing claims for recovery 
of Medicaid expenses paid to treat tobacco related illnesses.57 
Mississippi was the first state to file such a claim in 1994, and 
                                                                                                                                     
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1965). 
 49. See Smith, supra note 36, at 14. 
 50. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 73. In a fraud claim, the 
plaintiff would argue that the tobacco manufacturer fraudulently misrepre-
sented the health hazards of smoking in their advertising. Cipollone, 505 
U.S. at 527–29. Similarly, in breach of express warranty claims the plaintiff 
would argue that the tobacco manufacturer’s advertising statements affirmed 
that their products were not dangerous to the smoker’s health and therefore 
created an express warranty to the consumer. Id. at 525–27. 
 53. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Smith, supra note 37, at 18. 
 57. See id. at 22. 
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by 1998 all fifty states had filed a cost recovery lawsuit against 
tobacco manufacturers.58 
In 1998, the tobacco manufacturers ended their long-held pol-
icy of refusing to settle and signed the Master Settlement 
Agreement (“MSA”) that ended the Medicaid reimbursement 
lawsuits and precluded the states from bringing any similar 
litigation against the tobacco manufacturers in the United 
States in the future.59 Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Minne-
sota reached separate settlement agreements with the tobacco 
manufacturers.60 As part of the MSA, tobacco manufacturers 
agreed to pay the states US$206 billion over twenty-five years, 
with subsequent additional payments determined by the 
amount of cigarettes sold.61 In addition, the tobacco manufac-
turers agreed to fund public anti-smoking education efforts, 
disbanded organizations that promoted the industry’s inter-
ests—such as the Tobacco Institute—and ceased advertising 
targeted towards young people.62 
While the MSA may have contributed to lower rates of tobac-
co consumption, it is not without its flaws.63 Some have argued 
that the MSA is an inefficient way of collecting a de facto ciga-
rette excise tax.64 This criticism inherently implicates a ques-
tion of legislative primacy: does the MSA “[sidestep] the demo-
cratic process” normally required to impose taxes? 65  Others 
have suggested that it may violate the Social Security Act,66 
federal anti-trust law,67 or the U.S. Constitution.68 Another im-
portant criticism of the MSA is that it does not dedicate money 
                                                                                                                                     
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 23. 
 60. See Sloan & Chepke, supra note 38, at 166. 
 61. See id. at 161. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See, e.g., Robert W. Bauer, Sanders v. Brown: State-Action Immunity 
and Judicial Protection of the Master Settlement Agreement, 34 J. CORP. L. 
1291, 1291–92 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Do-
main: Lessons from the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 365 (2005); 
Cupp World, supra note 15, at 301–02; Sloan & Chepke, supra note 38, at 
163. 
 65. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 301–02. 
 66. See Gregory W. Traylor, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and 
the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081 
(2010). 
 67. See Sloan & Chepke, supra note 38, at 179–82. 
 68. See id. at 174–79. 
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paid by tobacco manufacturers to smoking cessation programs 
or even to health care.69 The money that the states collect can 
be used for any purpose, including “infrastructure, prisons, or 
tax cuts.”70 
Despite its criticisms, the MSA represents an important de-
velopment in United States tobacco litigation. Plaintiffs, in this 
case states seeking recovery of health care costs, were finally 
able to succeed against the tobacco industry. As the next sec-
tion discusses, the development of tobacco litigation in Canada 
followed the same path—individual plaintiffs initially strug-
gling, with provincial health care recovery suits later finding 
success. 
B. History of Tobacco Litigation in Canada 
Until recently, tobacco litigation in Canada has seen much 
less activity than in the United States, and has been much 
more favorable to defendants.71 The first tobacco suit in Cana-
da, Perron v. R.J.R. Macdonald Inc., was filed in 1988 but was 
dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired.72 The 
next tobacco suit filed in Canada, Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco 
Ltd., asserted a class action claim in 1995 on behalf of “all resi-
dents of Ontario, whether living or now deceased, who have ev-
er smoked cigarette products manufactured . . . by the defend-
ants.” 73  In 2004, the Caputo class was decertified because 
plaintiffs had “combined at least five, and possibly more, clas-
ses, not to mention innumerable subclasses, into one globally 
defined class for the purpose of seeking certification. In adopt-
ing this strategy, the plaintiffs ha[d] presented an action lack-
ing a core of commonality.”74  In 1997, an individual claimant   
 
                                                                                                                                     
 69. See Smith, supra note 37, at 23. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Smith, supra note 37, at 27; Cupp World, supra note 15, at 290–91. 
 72. See Perron v. R.J.R. Macdonald Inc., 1993 CanLII 1125 (BC SC) (Can.). 
 73. Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2004 CanLII 24753 (ON SC) (Can.). 
 74. Id. To satisfy the commonality requirement, plaintiffs must demon-
strate “a single class sharing substantial ‘common issues,’ the resolution of 
which will significantly advance the claim of each class member.” Id. para. 
45. 
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brought suit against tobacco manufacturers in Spasic v. Impe-
rial Tobacco Ltd. and the case is still being litigated.75 
By the time the MSA was signed in the late 1990s, tobacco 
litigation in Canada was relatively undeveloped compared to 
American tobacco litigation; only three cases had ever been 
filed against tobacco manufacturers for tobacco related illness-
es in Canada, with none of the plaintiffs finding success.76 
However, in 1997, the British Columbia legislature passed 
the Cost Recovery Act, which allowed British Columbia to sue 
tobacco manufacturers to recover provincial funds spent treat-
ing smoking related illnesses.77 In 1998, the British Columbia 
legislature amended the Cost Recovery Act to include language 
that directed courts to presume that exposure to tobacco prod-
ucts had caused the plaintiff’s illness if the defendant had 
breached any “common law, equitable or statutory duty or obli-
gation owed to persons in British Columbia who have been ex-
posed or might become exposed to the type of tobacco prod-
uct.”78 Later that year, British Columbia filed the first cost re-
covery action brought by a provincial government against to-
bacco manufacturers in Canadian courts.79 However, the Brit-
ish Columbia Supreme Court struck down the Cost Recovery 
Act in 2000, on the grounds that the British Columbia legisla-
ture lacked the constitutional authority to target legislation at 
companies that were not headquartered in British Columbia.80 
The legislature subsequently amended the Cost Recovery Act 
to remove the unconstitutional extra-territoriality language.81 
British Columbia filed R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. the 
day the amended statute was enacted.82 The tobacco manufac-
turers again challenged the constitutionality of the statute and 
argued that the amended Cost Recovery Act was ultra vires for 
extraterritoriality, contrary to the rule of law, and inconsistent 
                                                                                                                                     
 75. See Spasic v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2003 CanLII 32909 (ON SC) 
(Can.). See also Tobacco Litigation: The Canadian Effort to Hold Tobacco 
Companies Accountable, SMOKE-FREE.CA (last visited Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.smoke-free.ca/litigation/webpages/Spasic.htm. 
 76. See Smith, supra note 37, at 26–28. 
 77. See id. at 28. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 291. 
 80. See JTI-MacDonald v. AG-BC, [2000] BCSC 0312 (Can.). 
 81. See Smith, supra note 37, at 29. 
 82. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 292. 
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with judicial independence.83 In 2005, the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld the amended Cost Recovery Act as constitu-
tional.84 The court held that, because of the “strong relation-
ships among the enacting territory (British Columbia), the sub-
ject matter of the law (compensation for the government of 
British Columbia’s tobacco-related health care costs) and the 
persons made subject to it (the tobacco manufacturers ulti-
mately responsible for those costs),” the Cost Recovery Act was 
“meaningfully connected to the province” and therefore not un-
constitutional for extraterritoriality.85 
In addition to the extraterritoriality challenge, the tobacco 
manufacturers challenged the Act for interfering with judicial 
independence, alleging that it interfered with the adjudicative 
role of courts.86 They argued that by forcing the court to pre-
sume that the injured British Columbians “would not have 
been exposed to the [tobacco] product but for the [breach of 
common law, equitable, or statutory duty] . . . and the exposure 
. . . caused or contributed to the disease,”87 the statute com-
pelled the court to make “irrational presumptions.”88 The de-
fendants attacked this section of the Cost Recovery Act because 
it eliminated one of their defenses.89 
The tobacco manufacturers also argued that the Cost Recov-
ery Act was inconsistent with judicial independence because it 
“[subverted] the court’s ability to discover relevant facts.” 90 
They argued that the Cost Recovery Act hindered the court’s 
fact finding ability by not requiring the plaintiff to “identify 
                                                                                                                                     
 83. See F.C. DeCoste, Tradition and the Rule of Law in British Columbia 
v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 24 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 327, 329 
(2006). 
 84. See British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 
473 (Can.). 
 85. Id. para. 37. The tobacco companies argued “that the rule of law re-
quires that legislation: (1) be prospective; (2) be general in character; (3) not 
confer special privileges on the government, except where necessary for effec-
tive governance; and (4) ensure a fair civil trial.” Id. para. 63. However, the 
court held that “none of these requirements enjoy constitutional protection in 
Canada.” Id. para. 64. 
 86. Id. para. 48. 
 87. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 
30, §3(2). 
 88. British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 48. 
 89. As will be discussed in Part IV, this section of the Cost Recovery Act 
addresses the tobacco manufacturer’s causation arguments. 
 90. See British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 48. 
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particular individual insured persons, to prove the cause of to-
bacco related disease in any particular individual insured per-
son, or to prove the cost of health care benefits for any particu-
lar individual insured person.”91 Again, the defendants were 
attacking a section of the Cost Recovery Act that attenuated 
one of their strongest defenses—their assumption of risk ar-
gument. 
The court noted that the Cost Recovery Act was “not as un-
fair or illogical” as the tobacco manufacturers claimed because 
the rules in the Cost Recovery Act “[reflected] legitimate policy 
concerns of the British Columbia legislature regarding the sys-
temic advantages tobacco manufacturers enjoy when claims for 
tobacco-related harm are litigated through individualistic 
common law tort actions.”92 The crucial question addressed by 
the supreme court was “not whether the Act’s rules [were] un-
fair or illogical . . . but whether they interfere[d] with the 
court’s adjudicative role, and thus judicial independence.”93 The 
court found the statute was constitutional, despite the fact that 
it shifted the burden of proof and limited the tobacco manufac-
turer’s ability to compel discovery of an individual’s medical 
records, because it did not interfere with the court’s central 
function of adjudicating disputes.94 In so holding, the Canadian 
Supreme Court affirmed two important sections of the Cost Re-
covery Act that lend themselves favorably to provincial plain-
tiffs in tobacco litigation.95 The ruling also provided a judicial 
blueprint for upholding similar legislation in the future.96 If 
Canada were to pass a statute similar to the Cost Recovery Act 
aimed at food litigation, the Canadian courts would have a 
strong precedent in upholding the statute from similar attacks. 
C. The Canadian Supreme Court’s Decision in R. v. Imperial 
Tobacco Canada Ltd. 
Though the tobacco manufacturer’s arguments failed to ren-
der the Cost Recovery Act unconstitutional in 2005, the manu-
                                                                                                                                     
 91. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 
30, §2(5). 
 92. British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 49. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at para. 55. 
 95. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 296–97. 
 96. See British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473. 
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facturers continued trying to limit their liability. 97  Tobacco 
manufacturers would next attempt to divert blame by implead-
ing the Canadian federal government.98 
In the 1950s and 1960s, as worldwide awareness of the 
health risks of smoking began to grow, Canada adopted a pub-
lic health policy to encourage citizens to smoke light cigarettes. 
It was commonly believed at the time that light cigarettes were 
less harmful than regular cigarettes.99 Pursuant to this policy, 
the Canadian government advised and assisted tobacco manu-
facturers in developing strains of low-tar tobacco.100 
In light of Canada’s former policy, on June 6, 2007, the tobac-
co manufacturers filed a third-party claim impleading the Ca-
nadian federal government in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada 
Ltd., British Columbia’s cost recovery suit.101 The tobacco com-
panies argued that Canada should be held liable as a “manu-
facturer”102 under the Cost Recovery Act for the role it played 
                                                                                                                                     
 97. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42. 
 98. See id. 
 99. In the 1950s, an emerging awareness of the dangers of cigarette smok-
ing started to grow and Canada, recognizing the health risk, began funding 
research into the link between cigarettes and cancer. See British Columbia v. 
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, [2009] B.C.C.A. 540, para. 18 (Can.). In 
1963, Canada began an anti-smoking program designed to “encourage people 
to limit or stop smoking, to take steps to inform the public of smoking risks 
and to conduct research into manufacturing a less hazardous cigarette.” Id. 
para. 19. In the mid-1960s, Canada determined that, despite the public 
awareness of the dangers of smoking, some people would continue to smoke. 
Id. para. 22–23. At the time, it was believed that cigarettes with lower levels 
of tar and nicotine (light cigarettes) were less harmful. Id. 
 100. Relying on this theory, Canada “gave advice, made requests or gave 
directions to cigarette manufacturers about the development and promotion 
of light and mild products” and helped to “develop strains of tobacco particu-
larly suitable for use in light and mild products that were eventually sold to 
consumers in British Columbia.” Id. In 1973, the Canadian Minister of 
Health “announced that officials of Health Canada and Agriculture Canada 
along with the tobacco industry were endeavoring to develop strains of tobac-
co that would lower tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes.” Id. para. 24. Be-
tween 1979 and 1983, Canada developed several varieties of low tar tobacco. 
Id. para. 25. By 1983, 95% of tobacco available to manufacturers was devel-
oped by Agriculture Canada and “nearly all tobacco products consumed in 
British Columbia were manufactured from these varieties.” Id. 
 101. See Third Party Notice of Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, British 
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, 2008 BCSC 419 (Can.). 
 102. Under the Cost Recovery Act, a “manufacturer” is defined as “a person 
who manufactures or has manufactured a tobacco product and includes a 
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in the development of low-tar tobacco.103 They also argued that 
if they were found liable to British Columbia for reimburse-
ment of health care costs, they were “entitled to compensation 
from Canada for negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, 
and failure to warn.”104 In filing this third-party petition, the 
tobacco manufacturers were falling back onto the tactic of pro-
longing the litigation; a tactic that had proved successful for 
                                                                                                                                     
person who currently or in the past (a) causes, directly or indirectly, through 
arrangements with contractors, subcontractors, licensees, franchisees or oth-
ers, the manufacture of a tobacco product, (b) for any fiscal year of the person, 
derives at least 10% of revenues, determined on a consolidated basis in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles in Canada, from the 
manufacture or promotion of tobacco products by that person or by other per-
sons, (c) engages in, or causes, directly or indirectly, other persons to engage 
in the promotion of a tobacco product, or (d) is a trade association primarily 
engaged in (i)  the advancement of the interests of manufacturers, (ii)  the 
promotion of a tobacco product, or (iii)  causing, directly or indirectly, other 
persons to engage in the promotion of a tobacco product.” Tobacco Damages 
and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 30, §1. 
 103. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 12–13. Regarding the tobac-
co companies’ argument that Canada qualified as a “manufacturer” under the 
Cost Recovery Act, the court held that the statute’s reference to “revenue per-
centage” and “market share” showed that the British Columbia “legislature 
did not intend to include the federal government as a potential manufactur-
er.” Id. para. 124–25. The court determined that “holding Canada accounta-
ble under the CRA would defeat the legislature’s intention of transferring the 
health-care costs resulting from tobacco related wrongs from taxpayers to the 
tobacco industry.” Id. para. 120. 
 104. See id. para. 2. The court dismissed the tobacco companies’ negligent 
design and failure to warn claims against Canada on the same theory of sov-
ereign immunity that they applied to the negligent misrepresentation claim. 
Id. para. 105, 111. However, the court failed to reconsider the conduct at is-
sue when deciding whether to dismiss those claims. Id. The court could have 
separated the two types of conduct, and applied the most appropriate conduct 
to each claim, which would have greatly affected the court’s analysis of the 
different conduct at issue. For instance, in deciding the negligent design 
claim, the court held that “the decision to develop low-tar strains of tobacco 
on the belief that the resulting cigarettes would be less harmful to health is a 
decision that constitutes a course or principle of action based on Canada’s 
health policy. It was a decision based on social and economic factors.” Id. pa-
ra. 116. It is interesting to consider whether this claim would have been dis-
missed for policy considerations under Canada’s previously dominant “poli-
cy/operational test.” It could be argued that the decision to advocate light 
cigarettes as more healthy was a policy decision, and that developing and 
selling strains of tobacco were operational actions designed to carry out the 
overall policy of healthier smoking. 
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the tobacco industry in the past when plaintiffs with fewer re-
sources were unable to maintain years of litigation.105 
On July 29, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed 
the federal government as a third party.106 In deciding whether 
to dismiss the tobacco companies’ claim for negligent misrepre-
sentation, the court first examined whether policy concerns 
outweighed Canada’s duty of care in its role as advisor to the 
tobacco manufacturers.107 The court focused its policy discus-
sion on Canada’s assertions regarding the health benefits of 
smoking light cigarettes over regular cigarettes, rather than 
Canada’s “role in developing and growing a strain of low-tar 
tobacco and collecting royalties on the product.”108 Canada ar-
gued that its statements were made in support of its policy de-
cision to encourage healthier smoking habits and that “[t]rue 
policy decisions should be exempt from tortious claims so that 
governments are not restricted in making decisions based upon 
                                                                                                                                     
 105. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74. 
 106. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42. 
 107. See id. para. 47. The court first determined whether the claim had a 
“reasonable prospect of success.” Id. para. 17. To determine the prospect of 
success, the court considered whether “the general requirements for liability 
in tort are met.” Id. para. 38. The first part of this test asks “whether the 
facts disclose a relationship of proximity in which failure to take reasonable 
care might foreseeably cause loss or harm to the plaintiff.” Id. para. 39. On 
this first issue, the court held that such a relationship did exist because 
“Canada assumed the role of adviser to a finite number of manufacturers and 
that there were commercial relationships entered into between Canada and 
the companies based in part on the advice given to the companies by govern-
ment officials.” Id. para. 53. The court went on to hold that “Canada’s regula-
tory powers over the manufacturers, coupled with its specific advice and its 
commercial involvement” made the tobacco manufacturers’ reliance on Cana-
da reasonable. Id. para. 54. 
 108. Id. para. 67. In determining the conduct at issue for the negligent mis-
representation claim, the court found that the tobacco manufacturers had 
“merged the two types of conduct [Canada’s representation that low-tar to-
bacco was less harmful and Canada’s role in developing low-tar tobacco], em-
phasizing aspects that cast Canada in the role of business operator in the 
tobacco industry.” Id. The court held that “in considering negligent misrepre-
sentation, only the first type of conduct—conduct relevant to statements and 
representations made by Canada—is at issue.” Id. By focusing solely on Can-
ada’s statements regarding the health impact of low-tar tobacco, the court 
was able to effectively ignore the impact that Canada’s actions had on the 
issue of state immunity. 
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social, political or economic factors.”109 The tobacco manufac-
turers argued that Canada’s assertions represented “opera-
tional acts” designed to carry out the overall policy to support 
healthier smoking habits.110 
D. Sovereign Immunity in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. 
In reaching its decision in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada 
Ltd., the Canadian Supreme Court triggered a subtle but im-
portant shift in sovereign immunity doctrine.111 Generally, in 
common law countries, “government policy decisions are not 
justiciable and cannot give rise to tort liability.”112 However, 
“governments may attract liability in tort where government 
agents are negligent in carrying out prescribed duties. The 
problem is to devise a workable test to distinguish these situa-
tions.”113 Accordingly, the court first looked to Canadian prece-
dent to determine an appropriate test.114 
The first test, the “discretionary decision” approach, “holds 
that public authorities should be exempt from liability if they 
are acting within their discretion, unless the challenged deci-
sion is irrational.”115 The court noted that, because “many deci-
sions can be characterized as to some extent discretionary,” 
this test “has the potential to create an overbroad exemption 
for the conduct of governmental actors.”116 While it can be tem-
pered to “narrow the scope of the discretion,”117 this test did not 
                                                                                                                                     
 109. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 63 (citing Just v. British 
Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, para. 1240 (Can.)). 
 110. R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 64. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. para. 72. 
 113. Id. The court recognized the issue of policy considerations as “vexing,” 
noting that “much judicial ink has been spilled” analyzing the problem. Id. 
The court noted, “[o]n the one hand, it is important for public authorities to 
be liable in general for their negligent conduct in light of the pervasive role 
that they play in all aspects of society. Exempting all government actions 
from liability would result in intolerable outcomes. On the other hand, ‘the 
Crown is not a person and must be free to govern and make true policy deci-
sions without becoming subject to tort liability as a result of those decisions.’” 
Id. para. 76 (citing Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, para. 1239 
(Can.)). 
 114. R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 72–78. 
 115. Id. para. 73. 
 116. Id. para. 77. 
 117. Id. 
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become the predominant approach in Canadian jurispru-
dence.118 
The second test, the “policy/operational test” seeks to deter-
mine “which ‘true’ policy decisions are distinguished from ‘op-
erational’ decisions, which seek to carry out settled policy.”119 
While the policy/operational test became the dominant ap-
proach in Canada, it is not always easy to determine when a 
decision should be characterized as a policy decision or an op-
erational decision.120 As the court noted, 
Even low-level state employees may enjoy some discretion re-
lated to how much money is in the budget or which of a range 
of tasks is most important at a particular time. Is the decision 
of a social worker when to visit a troubled home, or the deci-
sion of a snow-plow operator when to sand an icy road, a poli-
cy decision or an operational decision?121 
With this difficulty in mind, the court also considered the ap-
proaches to sovereign immunity in the United Kingdom, 122 
Australia,123 and the United States124 in determining an appro-
priate test for protected policy decisions.125 
                                                                                                                                     
 118. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 74. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. para. 78. 
 121. Id. 
 122. In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords adopted a justiciability test 
in Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council. Id. para. 79. This test seeks to 
determine “whether the court is institutionally capable of deciding on the 
question, or ‘whether the court should accept that it has no role to play.’” Id. 
(citing Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council, [2001] 2 A.C. 550, 571 
(appeal taken from Eng.)). The Imperial court recognized that this test may 
be as unworkable as the discretionary decision and policy/operational ap-
proaches when it noted that the “long judicial voyage” ended with “a test that 
essentially restates the question. When should the court hold that a govern-
ment decision is protected from negligence liability? When the court con-
cludes that the matter is one for the government and not the courts.” R. v. 
Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 79 
 123. The two leading Australian cases on the issue, Sutherland Shire Coun-
cil v. Heyman and Pyrenees Shire Council v. Day, both found a court split on 
which approach to take. Id. para. 80. In Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman, 
Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson “adopted the Dorset Yacht rule that 
all discretionary decisions are immune,” and “endorsed the policy/operational 
distinctions as a logical test for discerning which decisions should be protect-
ed.” Id. Justice Mason adopted an approach which the Imperial court dubbed 
a “core policy,” id., approach when he held that “the dividing line between 
[policy and operation] will be observed if we recognize that a public authority 
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The Imperial court synthesized their multinational tour of 
sovereign immunity law into three basic observations. First, 
because “even routine tasks . . . like driving a government vehi-
cle” involve discretion, tests “based simply on the exercise of 
government discretion . . . [cast] the net of immunity too broad-
                                                                                                                                     
is under no duty of care in relation to decisions which involve or are dictated 
by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints.” Sutherland 
Shire Council v. Heyman (1985), 157 C.L.R. 424, para. 39 (Austl.). In Pyre-
nees Shire Council v. Day, the court was again divided with three justices 
adopting the Dorset Yacht rule and two justices adopting “different versions 
of the policy/operational distinction.” R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, at para. 
80. 
 124. In 1946, the United States waived immunity from tort claims in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. para. 81. The Act created exemptions for discre-
tionary functions, excluding liability in tort for “any claim . . . based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of the federal agency or an employee of the Gov-
ernment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680 
(a)(2006). In Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that the discretionary function exception “protects only governmental actions 
and decisions based on considerations of public policy,” because it “was Con-
gress’ desire to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and adminis-
trative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through 
the medium of an action in tort.” Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 
531, 536–37 (1988) (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 
(1984)). In 1991, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Gaubert held that the “focus of 
the inquiry is . . . on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are 
susceptible to policy analysis.” U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991). In 
concurrence, Justice Scalia supported a policy/operational distinction as “rel-
evant to the discretionary function inquiry,” but felt that the decision maker’s 
position of authority should influence the court’s discretionary function anal-
ysis. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia wrote: 
[N]ot only is it necessary for application of the discretionary function 
exception that the decision maker be an official who possesses the 
relevant policy responsibility, but also the decision maker’s close 
identification with policymaking can be strong evidence that the oth-
er half of the test is met—i.e., that the subject matter of the decision 
is one that ought to be informed by policy considerations . . . This 
immunity represents an absolute statutory presumption, so to speak, 
that all regulations involve policy judgments that must not be inter-
fered with. I think there is a similar presumption, though not an ab-
solute one, that decisions reserved to policymaking levels involve 
such judgments—and the higher the policymaking level, the stronger 
the presumption. 
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 125. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 79–83. 
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ly.”126 Second, all jurisdictions support immunity from tort for 
“core policy” decisions.127 Finally, defining a core policy decision 
as “not operational” can be problematic because “decisions in 
real life may not fall neatly into one category or the other.”128 
With these observations in mind, the court concluded that “core 
policy government decisions protected from suit are decisions 
as to a course or principle of action that are based on public 
policy considerations, such as economic, social and political fac-
tors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad 
faith.”129 
Applying this new “core policy” test to the negligent misrep-
resentation claim, the court asked “whether the alleged repre-
sentations of Canada to the tobacco companies that low-tar cig-
arettes are less harmful to health are matters of policy, in the 
sense that they constitute a course or principle of action of the 
government.”130 The court dismissed the tobacco manufactur-
er’s third-party claim because Canada’s representations were 
“part and parcel of a government policy to encourage people 
who continued to smoke to switch to low-tar cigarettes.”131 
In R. v. Imperial Tobacco, the tobacco manufacturers were 
attempting to strategically muddy the waters of the litigation. 
Impleading the Canadian federal government benefited the to-
bacco manufacturers not only by potentially limiting their lia-
bility for repayment of the provincial medical costs, but also by 
prolonging any ultimate judgment on those central issues. By 
introducing complex legal questions unrelated to their own lia-
bility, the tobacco manufacturers were able to derail the litiga-
tion for over four years. However, the court’s decision refocused 
                                                                                                                                     
 126. Id. para. 84. 
 127. Id. para. 85. 
 128. Id. para. 86. 
 129. Id. para. 90. The court noted that this “core policy” approach was not a 
“black and white test” because “difficult cases may be expected to arise from 
time to time here it is not easy to decide whether the degree of ‘policy’ in-
volved suffices for protection from negligence liability.” Id. Nevertheless, the 
court was confident that “core policy” decisions would be “readily identifia-
ble.” Id. 
 130. Id. para. 92. 
 131. Id. para. 95. The court noted that the “course of action was adopted at 
the highest level in the Canadian government . . . involved social and econom-
ic considerations,” and was “developed . . . out of concern for the health of 
Canadians and the individual and institutional costs associated with tobacco-
related disease.” Id. 
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the course of the litigation on the parties at the heart of the 
Cost Recovery Act—provincial plaintiffs seeking health care 
costs from tobacco manufacturers.132 
III. ISSUES IN FAST FOOD LITIGATION 
In claims against food manufacturers or retailers, plaintiffs 
seeking damages for the food’s contribution to their obesity 
have faced difficult issues involving causation and assumption 
of risk.133 An examination of food litigation in the United States 
will demonstrate the issues involved in fast food litigation, in-
cluding causation and assumption of risk arguments. As dis-
cussed in Part II, these are the same arguments that were uti-
lized by the tobacco manufacturers in tobacco litigation.134 
One of the most well-known fast food litigation cases in the 
United States is Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.135 In Pelman, two 
minors sued the fast food restaurant McDonalds claiming, 
among other things, that “McDonalds acted at least negligently 
in selling food products that are high in cholesterol, fat, salt 
and sugar when studies show that such foods cause obesity and 
detrimental health effects.”136 
One of the weaknesses of the plaintiffs’ claims in Pelman137 is 
common to food litigation in general. The Pelman court ele-
gantly expressed this issue, asking “where should the line be 
drawn between an individual’s own responsibility to take care 
of herself, and society’s responsibility to ensure that others 
shield her?”138 The court held that “if consumers know (or rea-
sonably should know) the potential ill health effects of eating at 
McDonalds, they cannot blame McDonalds if they, nonetheless, 
choose to satiate their appetite with a surfeit of supersized 
McDonalds products.”139 The Pelman court dismissed the plain-
tiffs’ negligence claim, holding that “it is well-known that fast 
food in general, and McDonalds’ products in particular, contain 
high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar, and that such 
                                                                                                                                     
 132. See generally id. 
 133. See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 134. See Courtney, supra note 17, at 99. 
 135. See Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d. 
 136. Id. at 520. 
 137. See id. at 516. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 517–18. 
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attributes are bad for one.”140 In so holding, the Pelman court is 
essentially addressing a problem of assumption of risk.141 The 
plaintiff is barred from recovery if he or she knew that eating 
certain foods would lead to obesity, yet chose to continue eating 
them despite the risk of adverse health implications.142 This 
same issue has arisen in tobacco litigation where the health 
hazards of smoking have long been well known. 143  Tobacco 
manufacturers have made the same argument that the food 
manufacturer made in Pelman: if a plaintiff knew about the 
health hazards of smoking and continued to smoke, they should 
be barred from recovery.144 
The Pelman court pointed out another issue that plaintiffs 
face in food litigation when it noted that “a number of factors 
other than diet may come into play in obesity and the health 
problems of which plaintiffs complain.”145 Essentially, the Pel-
man court was addressing the issue of causation; that is, when 
an injury has several possible causes, courts may have difficul-
ty assigning liability to one possible cause over another.146 For 
instance, in addition to diet, obesity can also be influenced by 
genetic factors.147 Therefore, McDonalds argued in Pelman that 
the plaintiffs’ obesity was hereditary, as opposed to being 
caused by eating McDonald’s food.148 Obesity can also increase 
the risk of heart disease;149 however, propensity for heart dis-
ease can be hereditary.150 Coincidentally, smoking also contrib-
                                                                                                                                     
 140. Id. at 532. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litiga-
tion, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 864 (1992). 
 144. See Courtney, supra note 17, at 99. 
 145. See Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d at 539. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Health Lifestyles: Obesity, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN HEALTH SYSTEM (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2011), 
http://dwb4.unl.edu/Chem/CHEM869P/CHEM869PLinks/www.med.umich.ed
u/1libr/primry/life13.htm. 
 148. See Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d at 539. 
 149. See Obesity Information, AM. HEART ASS’N (last updated May 5, 2011), 
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/WeightManagement/Obes
ity/Obesity-Information_UCM_307908_Article.jsp#.TqwwqJuIm0s. 
 150. See William Haynes, Risk Factors for Heart Disease: Frequently Asked 
Questions, UNIV. OF IOWA HOSP. & CLINICS (Jan. 2004), 
http://www.uihealthcare.com/topics/medicaldepartments/internalmedicine/he
artriskfactors/index.html. 
1290 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
utes to heart disease.151 Therefore, both tobacco manufacturers 
and fast food retailers could argue that a plaintiff’s heart dis-
ease was hereditary, as opposed to being caused by smoking 
cigarettes or eating hamburgers. 
Another causation issue that the Pelman court addressed was 
that “any number of other factors then potentially could have 
affected the plaintiffs’ weight and health . . . the more often a 
plaintiff had eaten at McDonalds, the stronger the likelihood 
that it was the McDonalds’ food (as opposed to other foods) that 
affected the plaintiffs’ health.”152 Unless an obese plaintiff only 
ate at one fast food restaurant in his or her life, any single fast 
food manufacturer will have an argument similar to the previ-
ous causation argument. In Pelman, McDonalds argued that 
the plaintiffs’ obesity was not caused by McDonald’s food, but 
rather by the food from a different fast food restaurant. 153 
Again, defendants in food litigation and tobacco litigation have 
the same argument at their disposal. For instance, the New-
port cigarette company could have argued that a plaintiff’s can-
cer was caused by smoking Marlboro cigarettes. 
The Pelman court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims holding 
that the complaint failed “to allege with sufficient specificity 
that the McDonalds’ products were a proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs’ obesity and health problems.”154 In Pelman, issues of 
assumption of risk and proximate causation represented stum-
bling blocks for plaintiffs in food litigation.155 However, just as 
defendants in food litigation and tobacco litigation can use 
these arguments to rebut a plaintiff’s claim, the Cost Recovery 
Act and the subsequent tobacco litigation can be used to over-
come food and tobacco defendants’ assumption of risk and prox-
imate causation defenses. 
                                                                                                                                     
 151. See, e.g., Why Quit Smoking?, AM. HEART ASS’N, 
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/QuitSmoking/QuittingSm
oking/Why-Quit-Smoking_UCM_307847_Article.jsp#.TqwysZuIm0s (last up-
dated Aug. 30, 2011). 
 152. Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d at 538-539. 
 153. See id. at 539. 
 154. Id. at 540. 
 155. See id. 
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IV. PROVISIONS OF THE COST RECOVERY ACT THAT ARE 
BENEFICIAL TO FOOD LITIGATION PLAINTIFFS 
The current Cost Recovery Act contains several provisions 
that would benefit plaintiffs in food litigation by reducing their 
vulnerability to assumption of risk and causation arguments. 
The first provision specifically authorizes Canadian provinces 
to initiate cost recovery suits on behalf of patients treated for 
tobacco related illnesses.156 The Cost Recovery Act section 2(1) 
provides that “the government has a direct and distinct action 
against a manufacturer to recover the cost of health care bene-
fits caused or contributed to by a tobacco related wrong.”157 
Section 2(4)(b) provides that “in an action under subsection (1), 
the government may recover the cost of health care benefits . . . 
on an aggregate basis, for a population of insured persons as a 
result of exposure to a type of tobacco product.”158 
This was an important provision for plaintiffs in overcoming 
the assumption of risk defense raised by tobacco manufactur-
ers. There are two theories that address how cost recovery suits 
involving government entities rebut the assumption of risk ar-
gument in tobacco cases.159 The first theory posits that the suit 
places the assumption of risk “one step removed because the 
states were suing on behalf of smokers.”160 Because it is the 
provincial government that is bringing the lawsuit seeking re-
imbursement for health care costs, the cause of action is “one 
step removed” from the injured smoker who chose to use tobac-
co products.161 
The second theory of how cost recovery suits involving gov-
ernment entities rebut the assumption of risk argument in to-
bacco cases is the unjust enrichment theory.162 This theory dif-
fers from the “one-step-removed” theory in that it does not as-
                                                                                                                                     
 156. Cupp World, supra note 15, at 291. 
 157. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 
30, §2(1). 
 158. Id. §2(4)(b). 
 159. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After 
Tobacco: Is the Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair 
Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 696 (2000) [hereinafter Cupp Domino]; see also 
Traylor, supra note 66, at 1097 n.107. 
 160. See Cupp Domino, supra note 159, at 696. 
 161. Id. at 689. 
 162. See Traylor, supra note 66, at 1097 n.107. 
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sume that “the states were suing on behalf of smokers.”163 In-
stead, it posits that, “the states were suing on behalf of taxpay-
ers who bore the financial burden of Medicaid-covered smokers’ 
health care.”164 The unjust enrichment theory argues that these 
taxpayers “expended hundreds of millions of dollars in caring 
for their fellow citizens,” and tobacco manufacturers were “un-
justly enriched to the extent that [the] taxpayers have had to 
pay these costs.”165 
Both the “one step removed” theory and the unjust enrich-
ment theory serve to introduce a counter-argument to tobacco 
manufacturers’ assumption of risk argument. The two theories 
share the same underlying premise: regardless of whether the 
province was suing on behalf of the smokers or the taxpayers, 
it is the province that has the cause of action to recover health 
care costs.166 The injury suffered by the smoker (illness) is sus-
ceptible to the assumption of risk argument if the smoker knew 
about the health hazards associated with tobacco use.167 How-
ever, the injury suffered by the province (payment for medical 
care) would not be affected by the smoker’s knowledge.168 As 
was discussed in Part I, one of the central tenets of Canada’s 
health care system is universal access: even smokers who knew 
the health risks and still smoked are entitled to treatment.169 
By assigning the injury to the province that paid the health 
care costs, the Cost Recovery Act has removed the smoker that 
was the target of the assumption of risk defense.170 
If a statute similar to the Cost Recovery Act were enacted to 
provide provinces with a direct cause of action against food re-
tailers to recover medical costs associated with obesity, the 
same counter-argument could be used by plaintiffs in food liti-
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gation. If such legislation was enacted, provinces could rebut 
food retailers’ assumption of risk argument by responding that 
the province did not choose to eat foods high in fat and calories, 
rather they are seeking reimbursement for health care costs 
paid by provincial taxpayers to treat obesity related illnesses. 
Another provision of the Cost Recovery Act that would be 
beneficial to food litigation plaintiffs in Canada is section 
2(5)(a).171 Under section 2(5)(a) of the Cost Recovery Act, 
If the government seeks in an action under subsection (1) to 
recover the cost of health care benefits on an aggregate basis, 
it is not necessary to identify particular individual insured 
persons, to prove the cause of tobacco related disease in any 
particular individual insured person, or to prove the cost of 
health care benefits for any particular individual insured per-
son.172 
This section of the Cost Recovery Act also limits the discovery 
access to any individual patient’s testimony or medical docu-
ments, and allows the government to prove health care benefits 
through “a statistically meaningful sample of documents.”173 It 
also provides clear separation between the smoker’s physical 
injury, and the province’s financial injury in paying medical 
costs. By elucidating this distinction, section 2(5)(a) further at-
tenuates the tobacco companies’ assumption of risk arguments 
as discussed above. In addition, this section generally “[eases] 
the government’s case against tobacco manufacturers” by low-
ering the burden of proof.174 
If legislation similar to the Cost Recovery Act were passed 
with a provision like section 2(5)(a), provinces could sue food 
retailers to recover health care costs associated with obesity 
without having to prove any individual consumer’s injury. If 
such legislation were passed, it would also certainly “ease the 
government’s case” against food manufacturers and fast food 
retailers.175 
Finally, the Cost Recovery Act also addresses the causation 
issues in tobacco litigation.176 Under the Cost Recovery Act, if 
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the tobacco manufacturer “breached a common law, equitable 
or statutory duty . . . the court must presume that the popula-
tion of insured persons who were exposed to the . . . tobacco 
product . . . would not have been exposed but for the breach.”177 
In addition, if the court finds a breach, it must presume that 
“the exposure . . . caused or contributed to the disease or risk of 
disease.”178 In other words, if there is a breach of duty, the 
court assumes the causation requirement has been met. This 
section of the Cost Recovery Act is important to provincial 
plaintiffs in the tobacco litigation because it effectively nullifies 
the tobacco manufacturer’s two strong causation arguments: 
that the disease was caused by something other than smoking, 
and that the disease was caused by the cigarettes of a different 
tobacco manufacturer.179 A similar provision could be passed by 
a provincial legislature authorizing provincial health care cost 
recovery against food manufacturers and retailers. In the fast 
food litigation context, this would eliminate a defendant’s ar-
gument that a different factor (such as heredity) caused the 
plaintiff’s obesity or heart disease, or that a different fast food 
restaurant (such as Burger King) caused the plaintiff’s obesity. 
These provisions in the Cost Recovery Act substantially as-
sisted the provincial plaintiff’s case against tobacco manufac-
turers by eliminating the tobacco defendant’s assumption of 
risk and causation arguments.180 Similar legislation aimed at 
food litigation in Canada would provide a great advantage to 
provincial plaintiffs seeking health care cost recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
The pattern of litigation in the United States began with in-
dividual plaintiffs having little success against tobacco manu-
facturers with better resources.181 As the litigation evolved to 
include class action claims and cost recovery suits, plaintiffs 
were able to find success in the MSA.182 Canadian provinces 
learned a valuable lesson from United States tobacco litigation 
when the provinces initiated their own cost recovery suits 
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against tobacco manufacturers.183 The Cost Recovery Act and 
the subsequent tobacco litigation in Canada demonstrated a 
litigation model that has found initial success in Canadian 
courts. This litigation model also provides a blueprint for 
health care cost recovery lawsuits that Canadian provinces 
could initiate against manufacturers and retailers in other in-
dustries, such as the food industry. 
By initially commencing health care reimbursement suits 
against food manufacturers, provincial plaintiffs will be able to 
immediately take advantage of the benefits of class action suits 
that the tobacco plaintiffs spent decades developing in the 
United States and Canada. And with strong precedent focusing 
cost recovery cases in Canadian courts on the central liability 
of the manufacturer, provincial plaintiffs may ultimately be 
successful in recouping health care costs paid to treat obesity 
related illnesses. 
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